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Two experiments report on the construction of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS), a
new measure for quantifying alterations to agency. In Experiment 1, 370 participants com-
pleted a preliminary version of the scale following hypnosis. Factor analysis revealed two
underlying factors: Involuntariness and Effortlessness. In Experiment 2, this two factor struc-
ture was conﬁrmed in a sample of 113 low, medium and high hypnotisable participants.
The two factors, Involuntariness and Effortlessness, correlated signiﬁcantly with hypnotis-
ability and pass rates for ideomotor, challenge and cognitive items. Twelve week test–
retest correlations showed that Involuntariness was highly stable, but Effortlessness only
moderately stable. Analysis of the combined datasets from Experiments 1 and 2 showed
both SOARS scores were signiﬁcantly related to the derived factors of Woody, Barnier,
and McConkey’s (2005) 4-factor model of hypnotisability. This scale clariﬁes conceptual
confusion around agentive action and provides empirical support for a multifactorial
account of sense of agency.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.1. Introduction
The experience of personal agency, the sense we have of controlling or initiating our actions, has been a topic of substan-
tial research within cognitive science in recent years (e.g., Friston, 2012; Haggard, 2008; Pacherie, 2007). One domain in
which marked alterations to sense of agency are regularly reported is that of hypnosis. One of the most striking aspects
of hypnosis is the reduced sense of volition that high hypnotisable individuals experience when following suggestions
(Hilgard, 1965; Kihlstrom, 1985; Lynn, 1997; Woody &McConkey, 2003). This change in feelings of control over one’s actions
in hypnosis has been called the ‘classic suggestion effect’ (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, p. 259) and is considered a deﬁning charac-
teristic of hypnotic behaviour. Kihlstrom (2008, p. 21) described the experiences of high hypnotisable people in hypnosis as
involving ‘‘subjective conviction bordering on delusion, and involuntariness bordering on compulsion’’.
There are three challenges to understanding sense of agency in hypnosis. First, there is considerable theoretical disagree-
ment among hypnosis researchers as to how and why hypnosis occurs and, in particular, the causes of alterations in the
sense of agency. Second, there is no canonical method for assessing alterations to sense of agency in hypnosis. Third, across
both theoretical and empirical research, labels and concepts have been applied inconsistently, leading to confusion over the
terminology related to sense of agency.
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Several competing theories purport to explain the phenomena of hypnosis and the associated shifts in sense of agency
experienced by high hypnotisable individuals. Many of these theories distinguish between executive control and executive
monitoring (Barnier & Oakley, 2009; Woody & Sadler, 2008). Executive control involves the voluntary initiation or termina-
tion of actions and thoughts. Executive monitoring involves the representation of perceptual and cognitive objects or events
in conscious awareness. These processes interact to initiate and control self-generated actions. The various theories propose
that hypnosis affects these cognitive systems in different ways.
One widely held view is that hypnosis affects executive monitoring processes while leaving executive control relatively
intact (Hilgard, 1979; Kihlstrom, 2008). This position, known as dissociated experience theory (K. Bowers, 1990), claims that,
during hypnosis, self-monitoring is impaired. Participants become unaware of particular aspects of their own cognition,
including their intentions and volition. This leads to the impression that self-generated actions occur effortlessly although,
in actuality, hypnotic responding does require cognitive effort. The involuntariness experienced in the hypnotic context, in
this case, reﬂects a dissociation between experienced and actual levels of cognitive effort.
Social cognitive theories (Lynn, Kirsch, & Hallquist, 2008; Lynn, 1997; Spanos, 1986, 1991) provide another view of dis-
ruption to executive monitoring in hypnosis. These theories claim that the interaction of environmental factors (such as the
setting in which hypnosis occurs), individual difference factors (such as the personality and motivation of the participant)
and social factors (such as the expectations and attributions associated with the relationship between hypnotist and subject)
leads to impairments in self-monitoring. Cognitive effort is required for hypnotic responding, but due to this impaired mon-
itoring, the subjective experience of participants is that actions occur effortlessly. The involuntariness experienced in the
hypnotic context, in this case, reﬂects a misattribution of the cause of self-generated actions.
A contrasting view is that hypnosis affects executive control while executive monitoring functions relatively normally (K.
Bowers, 1992; Woody & Sadler, 1998, 2008). This position, known as dissociated control theory (Bowers & Davidson, 1991),
claims that the hypnotic induction leads to a dissociation between executive control and lower level subsystems of action
generation. Because of this dissociation, suggestions from the hypnotist directly activate participants’ behaviour, bypassing
the normal processes of effortful executive control. The involuntariness experienced in the hypnotic context, in this case,
reﬂects genuinely low levels of cognitive effort. The positions outlined here do not represent a comprehensive account of
theories of hypnosis. For other views see Jamieson (2007) and Barnier, Dienes, and Mitchell (2008).
For dissociated experience and social cognitive theories, reduced sense of agency is due to a disconnection between exec-
utive functioning and executive monitoring processes. For the dissociated control theory, a reduced sense of agency in hyp-
nosis is due to a genuine reduction in the level of control individuals have over their actions. In all cases, however, the
experience of (high hypnotisable) participants in hypnosis is marked by signiﬁcant subjective alterations to sense of agency.
To be able to differentiate between these accounts we need appropriate ways to index agency alteration.
1.2. Measures of agency in hypnosis
There has been no consensus over the best way to assess alterations to sense of agency in hypnosis and no canonical
method has emerged. Despite the fact that agency alterations have been recognised as a central feature of hypnosis (Kihl-
strom, 2008; Weitzenhoffer, 1974; Woody & McConkey, 2003), many researchers have focused on participants’ subjective
experiences more generally. Examples of detailed methodologies for assessing the phenomenology of hypnosis include
the Experiential Analysis Technique (Sheehan & McConkey, 1982; EAT: Sheehan, 1992) and the Phenomenology of Con-
sciousness Inventory (PCI: Pekala, 1991). Both of these methods provide a comprehensive overview of participants’ experi-
ences during hypnosis and include assessments of sense of agency. Unfortunately both of these techniques require
considerable time to administer (the EAT is usually a 1 h interview whereas the PCI is a 53-item measure), and neither
has been extensively used in hypnosis research. A more common method for assessing subjective experiences in hypnosis
has been simply asking participants to make a single, retrospective, subjective rating of how a particular suggestion felt.
These ratings have usually been administered as part of standardised measures of hypnotisability and typically have taken
two forms: participants either have been asked to make numerical ratings of the degree to which they experienced invol-
untariness (or some related construct), or have been presented with several categorical descriptions of their subjective expe-
rience and asked to indicate which is the most accurate statement.
One difﬁculty with research involving numerical ratings is that participants have not always been asked to rate the same
thing. The Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, Stam, & Bertrand, 1983) asks
participants to rate the intensity with which they experience suggestions; the Creative Imagination Scale (Wilson & Barber,
1978) asks participants to rate the similarity of their experience of hypnotic suggestions to equivalent, non-hypnotic, events;
adaptations to the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) proposed by K.
Bowers (1981) and P. Bowers (1982) ask participants to rate feelings of involuntariness; and the ‘Inner Subjective Experi-
ences Scale’ (Kirsch, Council, & Wickless, 1990) asks for composite ratings of both realness and involuntariness.
Although each of these measures taps some aspect of subjective experience in hypnosis, the constructs investigated
(intensity, realness and involuntariness) are not equivalent and it is unclear how each relates to sense of agency. Research
into the heterogeneity of hypnotic performance has shown that high hypnotisable participants (‘‘highs’’) use several distinct
response styles (Sheehan & McConkey, 1982). For some types of highs, differing aspects of subjective experience could be
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tive style experience suggestions as compellingly real, while actively and effortfully constructing and synthesising the expe-
rience. These participants might be expected to rate the reality of suggestions as high but report low levels of involuntariness
(but see Barnier & McConkey, 1999). Measures that confound sense of agency with the experienced reality of a suggestion
would not provide an accurate account of the experiences of such individuals.
Another possibility is that agency alterations associated with different kinds of hypnotic suggestions may have different
subjective effects. For instance, a reduction in agency following an ideomotor suggestion (e.g., for arm heaviness) may be
experienced as subjective involuntariness, whereas a reduction in agency following a cognitive suggestion (e.g. for a visual
hallucination) may be experienced as subjective realness (Barnier et al., 2008). In any case, numerical ratings that concep-
tualise subjective experience in hypnosis as a unidimensional construct seem to be incomplete and inadequate measures of
sense of agency.
Categorical descriptors potentially allow for greater ﬂexibility of responses when assessing subjective experiences.
Researchers to date, however, have mainly used category scales only to assess the way in which feelings of involuntariness
vary over time (Bowers, Laurence, & Hart, 1988; Kihlstrom, 2002). For example, Bowers et al. (1988) created a ‘choice scale’
with ﬁve categorical descriptions of potential subjective experiences, speciﬁc to each item on the SHSS:C. This scale was
motivated by qualitative data from hypnotised participants indicating that involuntariness was not always experienced in
a consistent and uniform manner when responding to suggestions. Along with straightforward response options indicating
that actions in hypnosis occurred either deliberately or involuntarily, Bowers et al. included more complicated response op-
tions describing mixed feelings of purposeful control and involuntariness, as well as experiences of shifting control (such as
participants initiating responses voluntarily only to ﬁnd that they continued involuntarily). Unfortunately, options such as
these, while allowing for nuanced descriptions of the degree to which involuntariness waxes and wanes over time, still con-
ceptualise the range of possible experiences as simply falling on a unidimensional continuum from purposeful to involuntary
action.
1.3. Confusion of agency terminology
This methodology review highlights a third challenge to understanding agency in hypnosis. In both theoretical accounts
and empirical research, labels and terminology related to sense of agency have been used in inconsistent and potentially
incompatible ways. Broadly speaking, hypnosis theorists conceptualise reduced sense of agency as either an illusory misin-
terpretation of the ease with which self-generated actions occur in the hypnotic context (dissociated experience and social
cognitive theories; K. Bowers, 1990; Lynn et al., 2008) or a veridical assessment of the reduced levels of cognitive effort asso-
ciated with hypnotic responding (dissociated control theory; K. Bowers, 1992). In empirical studies, inconsistent terminology
and confounding of constructs such as intensity, realness and involuntariness has led to further confusion about how best to
understand the shifts in sense of agency associated with hypnosis.
Research into sense of agency outside the domain of hypnosis has encountered similar conceptual and deﬁnitional difﬁ-
culties. In the broader scientiﬁc literature, there are a great many words and phrases that have been associated with the
experience of being an agent. Examples include ‘planned’ (Haggard, Poonian, & Walsh, 2009), ‘under control’ (Moretto,
Walsh, & Haggard, 2011), ‘predictable’ (Sato & Yasuda, 2005), ‘self-generated’ (Teufel, Kingdon, Ingram, Wolpert, & Fletcher,
2010), ‘willed’ (Langdon, McLaren, Polito, Coltheart, & Ward, 2007), ‘intentional’ (Fotopoulou et al., 2008), ‘voluntary’ (Moore,
Wegner, & Haggard, 2009), ‘automatic’ (Haggard & Johnson, 2003), ‘caused by me’ (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008),
‘responsible’ (Kannape, Schwabe, Tadi, & Blanke, 2010) and ‘intentional’ (Obhi, Planetta, & Scantlebury, 2009). As is the case
within the hypnosis literature, researchers have not applied this vocabulary consistently and it has not always been clear if
various authors have been discussing the same concepts.
This deﬁnitional and conceptual confusion has been noted by several commentators (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; Bayne,
2006, 2008). Bayne pointed out that due to inconsistencies in the way we deﬁne and describe agency, it may be that current
theoretical models account for only some aspects of the phenomena and that academic descriptions may not accurately re-
ﬂect the experienced phenomenology of real life agents. This has led to proposals that there may, in fact, be multiple, distinct
components of sense of agency (Gallagher, 2000, 2012; Pacherie, 2007; Synofzik et al., 2008; de Vignemont & Fourneret,
2004). Two multi-dimensional frameworks are particularly useful.
Gallagher (2000, 2012) distinguished between a pre-reﬂective sense of agency and a reﬂective sense of agency. Pre-
reﬂective agency consists of a minimal ﬁrst-order self-awareness whereby individuals recognise themselves as the subject
of their experiences. Experience of this pre-reﬂective sense of agency is not the result of any sort of introspection or mon-
itoring, but is generated through primary sensory-motor processes. Reﬂective agency, by contrast, is a higher level introspec-
tive process that involves retrospective, self narrative explanations and may include descriptions of actions in terms of
beliefs, desires or intentions. These two components of sense of agency have different phenomenologies and are based on
a range of independent cognitive and motor indicators. The overall sense of agency for any particular action can be based
on either one of these aspects of agentive experience, or on an integration of the two.
Synofzik et al. (2008) also proposed two distinct components of sense of agency. They differentiated between ‘feeling of
agency’ and ‘judgement of agency’. ‘Feeling of agency’ is a non-conceptual, low level feeling of being the agent of an action.
This results from bottom-up integration of perceptual representations of the relationship between self and the world (i.e.,
internal perceptual signals related to feed-forward cues, proprioception and sensory feedback). ‘Judgement of agency’ is a
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representations of the context in which an action has occurred (i.e. high level representations of intentions, social cues and
thoughts). An individual’s overall sense of agency in any given situation is the result of integration of these two components.
Although these two models differ in their speciﬁc characterisations of the underlying factors, these models both claim
there are two components of sense of agency, based on distinct sets of perceptual or cognitive signals. Furthermore, both
models claim that sense of agency is not always generated in the same way, but that it results from the integration of
the most relevant inﬂuences on these two pathways at any given time.
In two experiments we sought to apply this nuanced understanding of the potential components of sense of agency to the
hypnotic context. To do this, we constructed a psychometric scale with items based on a broad conceptual understanding of
agency to clarify and operationalise the phenomenology of agency change in hypnosis. We undertook an analysis of the re-
cent literature to identify terms and phrases that had been used to describe the phenomenology of being an agent. We then
administered the resulting scale to participants during hypnosis.
There are three key advantages to developing and using such a scale in hypnosis. First, people vary considerably in their
responsiveness to hypnosis. Individuals who are not very responsive to hypnosis would not be expected to experience any
unusual alterations to their regular sense of agency, whereas high hypnotisable participants would be expected to experi-
ence a dramatically altered sense of agency. Including participants of differing levels of hypnotisability allowed us to analyse
sense of agency in participants undergoing a wide range of experiences.
Second, a typical hypnosis session includes a number of different types of hypnotic suggestions. Speciﬁcally, hypnotic
suggestions can be roughly categorised into three groups: ideomotor, challenge and cognitive (Hilgard, 1965; Woody & Bar-
nier, 2008). Ideomotor suggestions involve a speciﬁc physical movement, such as raising an arm. Challenge suggestions in-
volve participants being told they will have difﬁculty performing some task, such as opening their eyes, yet being instructed
to perform the task anyway. Cognitive suggestions involve experiencing an imagined event, such as a mosquito ﬂying around
the room. Empirical studies of sense of agency outside of hypnosis typically involve asking participants to complete a single,
albeit carefully manipulated, behavioural illusion task, often providing unexpected sensory feedback in response to partic-
ipants’ actions (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Sugimori, Asai, & Tanno, 2011). Investigating agency in hypnosis provides
an opportunity to assess participants’ responses to a range of striking agency alterations.
Third, although there has been considerable research into involuntariness in hypnosis (K. Bowers, 1981; P. Bowers, 1982;
Bowers et al., 1988; Kirsch et al., 1990; Spanos et al., 1983; Wilson & Barber, 1978), this work has progressed, for the most
part, separately from recent theoretical and empirical research into sense of agency more broadly. By constructing a scale
based on a broad range of research within the cognitive sciences and then applying this speciﬁcally to the hypnotic context,
we sought to integrate these bodies of research and to clarify some of the terminological and conceptual confusion around
sense of agency. Our aim was to develop a new reliable measure that comprehensively sampled the relevant domain of alter-
ations to sense of agency occurring in hypnosis. We did this by performing factor analysis on participants’ responses to a
wide range of agency descriptors, to clarify the most appropriate terminology to apply to agentive experience during
hypnosis.
2. Experiment
In Experiment 1 we constructed a scale to measure sense of agency in hypnosis. We investigated retrospective reports of
agency alterations in a large sample of participants experiencing hypnosis for the ﬁrst time by administering a preliminary
48-item version of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS) to participants immediately following the Harvard Group Scale
of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1962). This hypnotisability measure is the most frequently used
and best normed standardised measure of hypnotisability (Barnier & McConkey, 2004; Woody & Barnier, 2008).
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
We tested 370 undergraduate participants (240 female, 90 male, 40 not speciﬁed) at Macquarie University, of mean age
21.46 years (SD = 5.75). All participants were enrolled in a second year psychology course and were invited to participate in
this research as part of a 2 h class on hypnosis.
2.1.2. Construction of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale
In the ﬁrst phase of research, we constructed a scale to tap alterations to individuals’ subjective sense of agency. We re-
viewed the psychological (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Haggard & Johnson, 2003; Hag-
gard & Tsakiris, 2009; Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007),
philosophical (Carruthers, 2012; Gallagher, 2012; Hohwy, 2007; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2004; Nichols,
2011; de Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004) and neuroscientiﬁc (Haggard, 2008; Spengler, Von Cramon, & Brass, 2009; Sperduti,
Delaveau, Fossati, & Nadel, 2011; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010; Yomogida et al., 2010; Zhu, 2004) literatures. From this
review we identiﬁed 24 of the most commonly used words and phrases to describe the subjective experience of agency. For
each of these key phrases we generated two statements that could be applicable to an individual’s experience of agency in
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sible we used antonyms rather than simply negating the key phrase. For example the key phrase ‘passive’ became ‘I felt pas-
sive’ and ‘I felt active’; the phrase ‘surprise’ became ‘I was surprised by my responses’ and ‘I was able to predict what my
responses would be’. This resulted in a total of 48 items describing the experience of being an agent. These are shown in
Table 1.
2.1.3. Administration of the HGSHS
A. We tested participants during a regular tutorial class for a unit on social and personality psychology. The HGSHS:A is a
standardised measure of hypnotisability and was administered in this case via an audio recording played on CD. Our slightly
modiﬁed version had been recorded using culturally appropriate Australian English by a voice actor with an Australian ac-
cent. The recording consisted of a 12 min hypnotic induction during which participants were instructed to relax, close their
eyes and concentrate on the instructions being given, followed by 10 standard hypnotic suggestions: head falling, eye clo-
sure, hand lowering, ﬁnger lock, moving hands together, communication inhibition, experiencing of ﬂy, eye catalepsy, post-
hypnotic suggestion and posthypnotic amnesia. The standard HGSHS:A contains two additional items we did not use here for
reasons of time: arm immobilisation and arm rigidity. Following the suggestions, a hypnotic deinduction instructed partic-
ipants to slowly return to a state of alert wakefulness. Finally, we gave participants a scoring booklet in which they were
asked to indicate whether their behaviour passed speciﬁc objective criteria for each suggestion (e.g., did they move their
hand down at least 6 in. following the suggestion that their arm would feel heavy, or did they completely separate their
hands after receiving the suggestion that their ﬁngers would feel tightly stuck together). The number of behavioural criteria
passed indicates a participant’s hypnotisability.
2.1.4. Administration of the SOARS
After completing the HGSHS:A scoresheet, we asked participants to complete the 48-item SOARS. Items were presented in
a pseudo-random order, such that alternate versions of each key phrase were never presented in succession. Participants
indicated on a seven point Likert scale their level of agreement with each statement, ranging from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ (1)
to ‘‘strongly agree’’ (7). We titled the scale ‘Inner Subjective Experiences’ and included the following instructions:
In this section we are interested in your inner, subjective experiences during hypnosis. We are as interested in vague,
ambiguous experiences as we are in clear and powerful experiences. It is important to us to have your honest, candid
report of the nature of your own experience, so that we can gain an accurate, scientiﬁc understanding of these
phenomena.
Below are a series of statements about your experience. Please rate how much you agree with each statement, with a rat-
ing of ‘1’ meaning that you strongly disagree, ‘4’ meaning that you neither agree nor disagree and ‘7’ meaning that you
strongly agree.
You don’t need to think too much about each statement, just circle the number that seems most accurate.Table 1
Key phrases and corresponding scale items.
Key term Negative item Positive item
Effortful My experiences and actions occurred effortlessly My experiences and actions required my effort
Planned My responses were unplanned I planned my responses
Under control My experiences and actions were not under my control My experiences and actions were under my control
Surprising I was able to predict what my responses would be I was surprised by my responses
Self-generated My experiences and actions felt coerced My experiences and actions felt self-generated
Easy Following suggestions was hard Following suggestions was easy
Compliance Things just happened to me I tried to do the things I was asked
Willed My experiences and actions did not feel willed by me My experiences and actions felt willed by me
Chosen I did not choose how to respond I chose how to respond
Intentional My responses were not intentional I responded intentionally
Deliberate I responded automatically My responses were deliberate
Purposeful My experiences and actions occurred by themselves My experiences and actions were purposeful
Voluntary My responses were involuntary My responses were voluntary
Caused I felt that my experiences and actions were not caused by me I felt that my experiences and actions were caused by me
Inevitable My experiences and actions felt like they occurred by chance My experiences and actions felt inevitable
Absorbing I was mostly just playing along I was mostly absorbed in what was going on
Reluctant I embraced the suggestions freely I was reluctant to follow suggestions
Responsible I was not responsible for my experiences I was responsible for what I experienced
Robotic I felt in charge of my actions I felt like a robot or marionette
Passive I felt active I felt passive
Self initiated I did not initiate my actions or experiences My actions and experiences were initiated by me
Understood I didn’t know why things happened the way they did I knew why everything was happening
Ordinary My responses felt very different to normal everyday experiences My responses felt very similar to normal everyday experiences
Unavoidable I could decide whether or not to respond My responses felt unavoidable
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We ﬁrst subjected responses to items on the preliminary SOARS to an exploratory factor analysis. We then investigated
relationships between the derived factors and both hypnotisability scores and pass rates for hypnotic items of different
types.
2.2.1. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
We used EFA to assess the underlying factor structure of the 48-item SOARS. Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) sampling ade-
quacy (0.964) and Bartlett’s sphericity tests (x2(1128) = 10934.54, p < .001) indicated that factor analysis was appropriate.
Due to overlap in deﬁnitions of agency and interchangeability of terms in the literature, the dimensions underlying experi-
ence of agency were not expected to be entirely independent. We used principal axis extraction with promax rotation to
derive oblique factors. Analysis of the scree plot indicated a two or three factor solution. Investigating items in the three
factor solution, however, showed that one of the identiﬁed factors was a response style artefact (Zeller & Carmines,
1980). The SOARS consisted of positive and negative versions of 24 key phrases. In the three factor solution, these polar item
pairs loaded onto distinct factors. For example the item ‘my experiences and actions did not feel willed by me’ had a loading
of .634 on factor one, whereas the item ‘my experiences and actions felt willed by me’ had a loading of .746 on factor two.
A two factor solution provided a more consistent theoretical interpretation. In the two factor solution, positive and negative
items derived from the same phrase tended to load on a single factor. This solution accounted for 48.21% of the total variance
in SOARS scores. Correlation between the two factors was 0.554.
Items loading on the ﬁrst factor described a change in the automaticity with which actions occurred and focused on an
external locus of control. This factor represented a change in attributions of personal inﬂuence over actions; we named it
Involuntariness. Items loading on the second factor described the ease with which actions occurred and focused on the pas-
sive experience of events as they took place. This factor represented feelings of absorption in the task at hand; we named it
Effortlessness.
We constructed a shorter, consolidated, 10-item version the SOARS by selecting ﬁve of the highest loading items from
each factor for which there were no cross loadings greater than .30, ensuring an equivalent mix of positively and negatively
phrased items. These items are shown in Table 2. Both factor-derived subscales showed good internal consistency (subscale
1 alpha = .907; subscale 2 alpha = .734). Scores ranged from 5 to 35 for both Involuntariness (M = 17.59, SD = 7.16) and Effort-
lessness (M = 22.77, SD = 5.51). We used this 10-item SOARS in Experiment 2.
2.2.2. Relationship between SOARS, hypnotisability and hypnotic suggestions
We ﬁrst investigated relationships between the SOARS factors (Involuntariness and Effortlessness) and hypnotisability as
measured by the HGSHS:A. Participants in this sample crossed the full range of hypnotisability, scoring between 0 and 10 on
the HGSHS:A (M = 4.46, SD = 2.18). Both Involuntariness (r(364) = .555, p < .001) and Effortlessness (r(361) = .387, p < .001) cor-
related signiﬁcantly with the HGSHS:A, indicating that increased hypnotisability corresponded with alterations to both com-
ponents of sense of agency.
Next we investigated whether sense of agency was related to pass rates for different types of hypnotic suggestions (i.e.,
ideomotor, challenge, and cognitive). Ideomotor items in the HGSHS:A were ‘head falling’, ‘eye closure’, ‘hand lowering’ and
‘moving hands together’. Challenge items in the HGSHS:A were ‘ﬁnger lock’, ‘communication inhibition’ and ‘eye catalepsy’.
Cognitive items in the HGSHS:A were ‘experiencing of ﬂy’, ‘posthypnotic suggestion’ and ‘amnesia’. Involuntariness correlated
signiﬁcantly with pass rates for ideomotor items (r(361) = .460, p < .001), challenge items (r(365) = .404, p < .001) and cog-
nitive items (r(367) = .276, p < .001). Comparing these relationships showed that the correlation between Involuntariness andTable 2
Factor loadings of items selected for the SOARS after promax rotation.
Item Factor
1 2
Involuntariness
2. I chose how to respond 0.868 0.050
5. My experiences and actions were under my control 0.851 0.001
6. I felt that my experiences and actions were not caused by me 0.821 0.046
3. My experiences and actions felt self generated 0.810 0.068
9. My responses were involuntary 0.749 0.060
Effortlessness
4. I embraced the suggestions freely 0.163 0.736
7. My experiences and actions occurred effortlessly 0.002 0.637
1. Following suggestions was hard 0.098 0.628
8. I was mostly absorbed in what was going on 0.049 0.594
10. I was reluctant to follow suggestions 0.002 0.452
Note. Items marked with an asterisk () are reverse scored.
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correlation between Involuntariness and cognitive items (z = 3.24, p = .001; z = 2.27, p = .023). In other words, participants
who reported higher levels Involuntariness were more likely to pass all types of items. However, the relationship between
Involuntariness and cognitive items was not as strong as for other types of items.
Effortlessness also correlated signiﬁcantly with pass rates for ideomotor items (r(358) = .385, p < .001), challenge items
(r(362) = .265, p < .001) and cognitive items (r(364) = .166, p = .001). Comparing these relationships showed that the corre-
lation between Effortlessness and ideomotor items was signiﬁcantly stronger than the correlations with challenge (z = 2.04,
p = .041) or cognitive items (z = 3.57, p < .0005). So whereas participants who reported higher levels Effortlessnesswere more
likely to pass all types of items, this relationship was particularly pronounced for ideomotor items.
This new scale, constructed from terminology based on agency research outside of hypnosis, when applied here in the
hypnotic context, was signiﬁcantly related to hypnotisability scores. Furthermore, both SOARS subscale scores showed a sig-
niﬁcant association with each type of hypnotic suggestion (ideomotor, challenge, and cognitive).
3. Experiment
In Experiment 2 we sought to conﬁrm the factor structure of the SOARS. We administered the 10-item SOARS to partic-
ipants immediately following the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS:C: Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962).
This hypnotisability measure, administered in an individual rather than a group setting, provides a more detailed assessment
of hypnotisability than the HGSHS:A, especially of cognitive items. Individual testing also avoids some potential problems
with demand characteristics, which may occur in a group screening (Barnier & McConkey, 2004). As well as completing
the SOARS following hypnosis, participants in this study completed a qualitative interview in which they described their
experience of agency change.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
We tested 113 undergraduate participants (82 female, 31 male) at Macquarie University, of mean age 21.35 years
(SD = 5.56). Participants were prescreened for hypnotisability on the HGSHS:A (Shor & Orne, 1962) in Experiment 1. Our
sample consisted of 42 low hypnotisable participants (HGSHS:A scores less than or equal to 3), 39 medium hypnotisable par-
ticipants (HGSHS:A scores between 4 and 6) and 32 high hypnotisable participants (HGSHS:A scores between 7 and 10). We
paid participants $20 for taking part.
3.1.2. Administration of the SHSS:C (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962)
We ﬁrst administered a tailored version of the SHSS:C, which included 11 standard suggestions and 2 customised sugges-
tions that were part of a separate experiment (and will not be considered further). The SHSS:C consisted of a standard
hypnotic induction, hypnotic suggestions, and a deinduction. Suggestions in this measure were: hand lowering, moving
hands apart, mosquito hallucination, taste hallucination, arm rigidity, dream, age regression, leg immobilisation, negative
visual hallucination, anosmia and posthypnotic amnesia. The hypnotist scored participants’ responses to each suggestion
against speciﬁc criteria. For example, did participants react to a bottle of wintergreen oil (a strong smelling essence) placed
near the nose when given the suggestion that they would lose their sense of smell; did they twitch or move their hand when
given the suggestion that a mosquito was landing on it?
We considered participants who scored in the same category on both the HGSHS:A and the SHSS:C as having their hyp-
notisability conﬁrmed. Conﬁrming the hypnotisability of participants ﬁrst screened in a group setting with an individualised
screening such as the SHSS:C is best practice in hypnosis research (Kihlstrom, 2008). We conﬁrmed 23 participants as low
(SHSS:C less than or equal to 3), 19 as medium (SHSS:C scores between 4 and 6) and 27 as high hypnotisable (SHSS:C scores
between 7 and 11). Hypnotisability was not conﬁrmed for 44 participants.
3.1.3. Administration of the SOARS
We asked participants to complete the 10-item SOARS derived from Experiment 1, consisting of 5 items for the Involun-
tariness subscale and 5 items for the Effortlessness subscale. Items are shown in Table 2. Participants indicated their level of
agreement with each statement with regards to their experience during the preceding hypnosis session. Participants rated
each item on a seven point Likert scale, ranging from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ (1) to ‘‘strongly agree’’ (7).
3.1.4. Open interview
After completing the SOARS, we asked participants to describe their experiences during hypnosis, especially how their
actions might have been similar or different to performing actions normally and how in control or responsible they felt dur-
ing the experiment. We asked participants: (a) to describe how it felt to hear and follow suggestions, (b) how performing
actions here was similar or different to performing actions normally, (c) to describe being hypnotised, and (d) how in control
or responsible they felt for what occurred.
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We ﬁrst subjected responses to items on the SOARS to conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA). We then investigated relation-
ships between the SOARS scores and both hypnotisability scores and pass rates for hypnotic items of different types.
3.2.1. CFA of the SOARS
We used CFA to ensure that the factor structure for sense of agency identiﬁed in Experiment 1 was applicable to this sam-
ple. CFA was conducted using AMOS (version 19). The range of scores for Involuntariness was 5 to 35 (M = 19.20, SD = 6.05).
The range of scores for Effortlessness was 13–35 (M = 26.32, SD = 4.46). The two factor model showed good ﬁt, v2(34,
N = 115) = 48.35, p = .053, comparative ﬁt index = .958 and root-mean-square error of approximation = .061. Intercorrelation
between the two factors (Involuntariness and Effortlessness) was .373. The two factor structure therefore appears to be a sta-
ble and replicable model of sense of agency.
3.2.2. Relationship between SOARS, hypnotisability and hypnotic suggestions
We ﬁrst investigated relationships between the SOARS factors (Involuntariness and Effortlessness) and hypnotisability as
measured by the SHSS:C. Participants in this sample crossed the full range of hypnotisability, scoring between 0 and 11 on
the SHSS:C (M = 5.86, SD = 2.94). Both Involuntariness (r(113) = .426, p < .001) and Effortlessness (r(113) = .356, p < .001)
correlated signiﬁcantly with the SHSS:C, conﬁrming that increased hypnotisability corresponded with alterations to both
components of sense of agency.
Next we investigated whether sense of agency was related to pass rates for different types of hypnotic suggestions.
Ideomotor items in the SHSS:C were ‘hand lowering’ and ‘moving hands apart’. Challenge items were ‘arm rigidity’, ‘leg
immobilisation’, and ‘anosmia’. Cognitive items were ‘mosquito hallucination’, ‘taste hallucination’, ‘dream’, ‘age regression’,
‘negative visual hallucination’, and ‘posthypnotic suggestion’. Involuntariness correlated signiﬁcantly with pass rates for ideo-
motor items (r(112) = .281, p = .003), challenge items (r(112) = .393, p < .001) and cognitive items (r(112) = .333, p < .001).
Effortlessness correlated signiﬁcantly with pass rates for ideomotor items (r(112) = .321, p = .001), challenge items
(r(112) = .238, p = .011) and cognitive items (r(112) = .306, p = .001). Comparing these relationships showed that no correla-
tion was signiﬁcantly stronger than any other. Participants experiencing greater levels of Involuntariness and Effortlessness
were more likely to pass all item types.
3.2.3. Responses to open interview
Participants’ responses in the open interview gave some insight into their interpretation and understanding of their expe-
riences during hypnosis. To assess the validity of the SOARS, we were interested in the responses of participants with par-
ticularly low or high Involuntariness and Effortlessness scores. Participants who scored in the lowest quartile for
Involuntariness (scores less than 16) typically described their actions as occurring with a high level of control, for example:
‘‘I’d say most of the things you told me to do, I did voluntarily’’; or due to a conscious desire to comply with the hypnotist’s
instructions, for example: ‘‘I was agreeing or complying to requests, not doing things involuntarily’’. Participants who scored
in the highest quartile for Involuntariness (scores greater than 23) by contrast, described their actions as occurring without
deliberate control, for example: ‘‘you feel like you can’t do anything but listen to what’s being said and do what’s being said’’;
and without conscious planning, for example: ‘‘It feels a lot like an impulse. You sit here and someone tells you that your arm
feels heavy and then your arm will feel heavy.’’ Participants who scored in the lowest quartile for Effortlessness (scores less
than 23), described fairly normal experiences during hypnosis, characterised by feelings of control, for example: ‘‘Most of the
time I felt I could do anything’’; and ‘‘I felt very in control’’. Participants who scored in the highest quartile for Effortlessness
(scores greater than 29), however, described their actions as occurring spontaneously, for example: ‘‘I didn’t tell my body to
do them, they were just happening’’; and without speciﬁc intentions, for example: ‘‘It felt like I was just doing it without
saying ‘move my arm’ or anything - like I wasn’t doing it consciously but my body was just doing it’’. Overall, participants’
accounts of their experiences in hypnosis supported our theoretical framework. Individuals with low SOARS scores reported
fairly normal feelings of control characterised by deliberate and purposeful actions. Participants with high Involuntariness
scores reported an altered sense of agency characterised by actions that felt externally caused and that occurred impulsively.Table 3
Correlations between SOARS scores and Woody et al.’s (2005) 4-factor model of hypnotisability.
Factor Involuntariness Effortlessness
Direct motor 0.549*** 0.451***
Motor challenge 0.416*** 0.317**
Perceptual-cognitive 0.423*** 0.362***
Posthypnotic amnesia 0.360*** 0.260**
Note: n = 112.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
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ous movements that occurred without their conscious control.
The factor structure of the SOARS, with two distinct aspects to sense of agency (Involuntariness and Effortlessness) was
conﬁrmed in Experiment 2. Participants in a more difﬁcult hypnosis session with a greater proportion of cognitive sugges-
tions reported signiﬁcant levels of both Involuntariness and Effortlessness. Both factors again correlated signiﬁcantly with
hypnotisability as measured by the SHSS:C. SOARS scores also were related to pass rates for ideomotor, challenge and cog-
nitive items in the SHSS:C. These ﬁndings were supported by qualitative data from participants indicating that higher SOARS
scores corresponded to marked reductions in the subjective sense of agency during hypnosis.
4. Combined analysis
For our ﬁnal set of analyses we examined the reliability and applicability of the SOARS in a combined dataset of HGSHS:A
and SHSS:C items. This analysis allowed a more detailed examination of the relationship between sense of agency and
hypnotisability. Hypnotisability is usually expressed as a general capacity to experience hypnotic suggestions. In addition
to this general capacity, however, a number of theorists have conceptualised hypnotic ability as also involving speciﬁc com-
ponent abilities corresponding to the ideomotor, challenge and cognitive categories outlined above. More recently Woody,
Barnier, and McConkey (2005) proposed a four factor model of the component abilities of hypnotic responding, based on a
comprehensive empirical analysis of 5 years of hypnosis experiments (over 616 participants). The four factor model includes
three factors that are very similar to the traditional account (direct motor action, motor challenge and perceptual-cognitive)
and one additional factor: Posthypnotic Amnesia. Results from Experiments 1 and Experiment 2 indicated two stable
subscales comprising the SOARS: Involuntariness and Effortlessness. Here we investigated relationships among these SOARS
subscales and Woody et al.’s four factor model of hypnotic ability.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Creating the dataset
We generated a combined dataset comprising participants’ responses to all hypnotic items from both the HGSHS:A and
SHSS:C and SOARS factor scores from Experiments 1 and 2. There were 112 participants with complete records from both
experiments. The average interval between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was 12 weeks.
4.1.2. Component hypnotic abilities
Scores for the direct motor action, motor challenge and perceptual-cognitive factors were derived by calculating the num-
ber of relevant items passed in each category. For the direct motor factor, the relevant items were ‘head falling’, ‘eye closure’,
‘hand lowering’ and ‘moving hands together’ from the HGSHS:A and ‘hand lowering’, and ‘moving hands apart’ from the
SHSS:C. For the motor challenge factor, the relevant items were ‘ﬁnger lock’, ‘communication inhibition’ and ‘eye catalepsy’
from the HGSHS:A and ‘arm rigidity’ and ‘leg immobilization’ from the SHSS:C. For the perceptual-cognitive factor, the rel-
evant items were ‘ﬂy hallucination’ and ‘posthypnotic suggestion’ from the HGSHS:A and ‘mosquito hallucination’, ‘taste hal-
lucination’, ‘dream’, ‘age regression’ ‘anosmia’ and ‘negative visual hallucination’ from the SHSS:C. The Posthypnotic Amnesia
factor score was derived by calculating the total number of items that were not successfully recalled following the amnesia
suggestions in both hypnotisability screenings (i.e. 21 minus the total number of items recalled in both measures). In Woody
et al. (2005), the motor challenge factor also included the items ‘arm immobilization’ and ‘arm rigidity’ from the HGSHS:A
scale. The modiﬁed version of the scale used in Experiment 1 did not include these items so they could not be included in the
factor scale calculation.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Stability of the SOARS
Overall, Involuntariness scores were slightly higher in Experiment 2 (M = 19.20, SD = 6.05) compared to Experiment 1
(M = 18.64, SD = 7.42) although this difference was not signiﬁcant, t(112) = 1.13, p = .262. Effortlessness scores were signiﬁ-
cantly higher in Experiment 2 (M = 26.32, SD = 4.46) compared to Experiment 1 (M = 22.96, SD = 6.49), t(111) = 5.17,
p < .0005, indicating that participants were more likely to experience their actions as passively occurring without effort
when completing the SHSS:C items. The test–retest correlations over 12 weeks showed that Involuntarinesswas highly stable
(r = .703, p < .001), but Effortlessness only moderately stable (r = .366, p < .001). The signiﬁcant difference between the
strength of these correlations (z = 3.86, p < .0005) most likely reﬂects the different item sets across the HGSHS:A and the
SHSS:C, with a greater concentration of cognitive items in the SHSS:C compared to the HGSHS:A.
4.2.2. Sense of agency and component hypnotic abilities
We next examined relationships between SOARS scores (averaged across the HGSHS:A and the SHSS:C) and the derived
hypnotic ability subscales (direct motor, motor challenge, perceptual-cognitive and Posthypnotic Amnesia). These results are
shown in Table 3. Involuntariness showed a strong correlation with the direct motor factor and moderate correlations with
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with the direct motor, motor challenge and perceptual-cognitive factors; and a weak correlation with the Posthypnotic
Amnesia factor. There were no signiﬁcant differences between correlations for Involuntariness and Effortlessness with any
of the 4 derived factors.
5. Discussion
The present experiments reported on the development and initial validation of the SOARS. We created this scale to ad-
dress three challenges for understanding agency in hypnosis: no agreement on the cause of agency disruption, no canonical
method of measuring agency and no consistent language to describe and conceptualise agency. We constructed items for the
scale from a review of terms and phrases that have been used to describe agentive experience in the broader scientiﬁc
literature.
Factor analysis of responses to the 48-item preliminary agency scale revealed two factors underlying sense of agency:
Involuntariness and Effortlessness. This led to the construction of the SOARS, a 10-item scale that was signiﬁcantly correlated
with HGSHS:A scores and pass rates for ideomotor, challenge and cognitive items in Experiment 1. Conﬁrmatory factor
analysis in Experiment 2 validated the scale and conﬁrmed the two factor structure underlying sense of agency. Both
Involuntariness and Effortlessness were signiﬁcantly correlated with SHSS:C scores and pass rates for ideomotor, challenge
and cognitive items in Experiment 2. In an analysis of the combined datasets from Experiments 1 and 2, both SOARS sub-
scales were signiﬁcantly related to each of the derived factors of Woody et al.’s (2005) four-factor model of hypnotic items.
Empirically, our results suggest that the SOARS is a reliable measure of the subjective experience of self-generated ac-
tions. The test–retest correlations over 12 weeks showed particularly high stability for Involuntariness. Although signiﬁcant,
the magnitude of the reliability coefﬁcient for Effortlessnesswas moderate. It is important to note however that the two mea-
sures of hypnotisability we used to assess participants’ experiences of agency were not identical tests. The HGSHS:A consists
mainly of easy, motor suggestions, whereas the SHSS:C consists mainly of more difﬁcult hypnotic suggestions focused pri-
marily on alterations to cognitive and perceptual processes. SOARS scores from these two experiments showed that partic-
ipants’ sense of agency differed between these two hypnotisability tests.
Aspects of the experience of being an agent, speciﬁcally the degree of passive agency involved (as indexed by the ‘Effort-
lessness’ subscale) were quite different during the HGSHS:A hypnosis session, with its focus on physical movements, com-
pared with the SHSS:C hypnosis session, with its focus on internal imaginative experiences. Items in the SHSS:C include
suggestions for participants to experience kinaesthetic and visual hallucinations, an imagined waking dream, age regression,
altered olfactory sensations and amnesia. Although each of these items was evaluated in terms of (indirect) objective behav-
ioural criteria, the essence of such items is a subjective alteration in cognitive and perceptual experience. The main distinc-
tion between the Involuntariness and Effortlessness subscales across these experiments was that Effortlessness scores were
signiﬁcantly higher following the SHSS:C compared to the HGSHS:A. This indicates that whereas Involuntarinessmay be more
closely associated with traditional conceptions of the classic suggestion effect (Weitzenhoffer, 1974) and represents changes
in feelings of control over low level motor actions (better captured by HGSHS:A items), Effortlessness may be more closely
associated with higher order self-monitoring alterations (better captured by SHSS:C items). This interpretation is partially
supported by the pattern of correlations between pass rates for different types of items and scores on Involuntariness and
Effortlessness subscales.
The composition of the hypnotisability measures in Experiments 1 and 2 may have inﬂuenced the speciﬁc ways in which
agency was altered. This is consistent with the work of Woody et al. (2005), who found that the way in which a particular
hypnotic suggestion was experienced subjectively depended not only on the content of the speciﬁc suggestion but also on
the type of suggestions preceding it. It is worth noting that in this study participants always completed the HGSHS:A before
completing the SHSS:C, and that the SOARS was always administered after the completion of the relevant hypnotisability
screening. This means that responses made by participants were retrospective evaluations of their experience throughout
an entire hypnosis session. But since participants’ experiences of agency may vary (perhaps considerably) throughout a hyp-
nosis session, it may also be useful to ask participants to complete the scale with regards to their experience of a single sug-
gestion and to obtain these ratings immediately after the suggestion has been administered. The scale is sufﬁciently short
(10 items) to allow for repeated administration for several hypnotic suggestions of interest. Application of the SOARS to
investigate experiences related to speciﬁc hypnotic tasks would likely highlight further dissociations between Involuntari-
ness and Effortlessness.
Although we did not measure agency alteration related to speciﬁc items, our ﬁndings showed that all types of hypnotic
suggestion (i.e. ideomotor, challenge and cognitive) were related signiﬁcantly to both SOARS scores. This suggests that sense
of agency in hypnosis is not only altered for straightforward, physical motor actions (i.e., ideomotor items) but also for more
complex motor actions (such as challenge items that require the participant to make movements that contradict a suggested
state of affairs) and for cognitive items, which may not involve any physical movements at all. This indicates that during
hypnosis participants have a sense of agency not only for their body movements but also for perceptual and cognitive
experiences.
Sense of agency over such internal representations is a controversial area. Woody and Sadler (2008) argued for a funda-
mental mechanism that distinguishes between the internal and external origin of events (both motor actions and internal
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ipants to experience altered sense of agency. Researchers outside of hypnosis, however, have noted that theoretical accounts
of agency cannot easily explain the processes that might generate a sense of agency for internal representations, such as
thoughts (Synofzik et al., 2008; Vosgerau & Newen, 2007). Feedforward theories of agency stipulate that sense of agency de-
pends on a predictive representation within the motor system (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Wolpert, Ghahramani, &
Jordan, 1995), but it is unlikely that hypnotic cognitive alterations could have a motor system referent. An alternate perspec-
tive holds that sense of agency results from high level inferential judgements about the likely causes of perceived actions
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2004). These inferential theories also struggle to explain sense of agency for internal
representations as, according to this perspective, actions are experienced as self-generated if they are preceded by an appro-
priate thought. To propose that a mental representation, such as a thought, would also be experienced as self-generated
when preceded by a supervening, higher order, appropriate thought leads to an inﬁnite regress. The association between
SOARS scores and pass rates for cognitive items is therefore difﬁcult to reconcile with existing theories. As noted above, par-
ticipants in this study were asked to rate their sense of agency for the entire hypnosis session. A clearer understanding of
sense of agency for thoughts in hypnosis would be provided by speciﬁcally investigating agentive experiences related to cog-
nitive items and tracking the triggers and inﬂuences on agency alteration for these tasks.
Administering the SOARS to participants completing the HGSHS:A and SHSS:C has provided a new perspective on sense of
agency in hypnosis. Subjective involuntariness is an important and often discussed aspect of hypnotic responding (K. Bowers,
1981; P. Bowers, 1982; Bowers et al., 1988; Kirsch et al., 1990; McConkey, Wende, & Barnier, 1999; Spanos et al., 1983;
Wilson & Barber, 1978), but usually it has been understood as a single unitive construct. This may be because different hyp-
nosis theorists have attempted to explain different aspects of agentive action. Our scale with two factors (Involuntariness and
Effortlessness) offers an empirical means to assess subjective alterations to agency across multiple dimensions and is consis-
tent with theoretical views of sense of agency from outside the domain of hypnosis, which have also proposed two distinct
components of sense of agency (Gallagher, 2000, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2008). Gallagher’s (2000) notion of ‘‘explicit agency’’
refers to evaluative attributions about the experience of action. This is similar to Synofzik et al.’s (2008) ‘judgement of
agency’, which they describe as conceptual, interpretative judgments of action. The Involuntariness factor identiﬁed in our
experiments comprises items that involve deliberative evaluation of one’s experience, for example, ‘my experiences and ac-
tions were under my control’ and ‘I chose how to respond’, and seems compatible with these ideas. Gallagher (2012)’s ‘‘im-
plicit agency’’ refers to an awareness of oneself as the immediate subject of experience. This ﬁts nicely with Synofzik et al.’s
(2008) non-conceptual ‘feeling of agency’. Such a conceptualisation does not exactly map onto the Effortlessness dimension
identiﬁed in our experiments but there are some important parallels. For these theorists, ‘implicit agency’ or ‘feeling of
agency’ represents a low-level, ﬁrst-order awareness of acting that may occur in the absence of higher-order attributions
about the cause or nature of the action in question. This idea of a primary, automatic and immediate sense of being an agent
resonates with the Effortlessness factor identiﬁed here. The qualitative descriptions of participants scoring high in Effortless-
ness were characterised by claims that their bodies had made movements that they experienced as occurring automatically,
without planning or intention. In other words, these participants described situations in which they had awareness of their
actions but no higher order beliefs or intentions about those actions. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that our inves-
tigation of the various terms used to refer to sense of agency converges on a two factor model that ﬁts approximately within
the framework of recent theoretical accounts.
Our ﬁndings also showed a positive linear relationship between hypnotisability (for both screening measures) and factors
of the SOARS. The more hypnotisable a participant was, the more likely they were to experience both involuntariness and
effortlessness during the hypnosis session. This is consistent with our understanding of hypnotisability and, in particular,
with the notion that high hypnotisable individuals are prone to experiencing actions in hypnosis as occurring spontaneously
and without conscious volition. These ﬁndings, showing variation in the degree to which individuals experience alterations
to their sense of agency, further support the view that hypnosis is a multidimensional rather than a unidimensional or cat-
egorical construct.
One potential application of the SOARS could be to rule out malingering in hypnosis (or in other contexts). Whereas the
majority of researchers accept that hypnosis alters executive functioning (Hilgard, 1979; Lynn et al., 2008; Woody & Sadler,
2008), some maintain that the effects of hypnosis can largely be explained by compliance and expectation (Wagstaff, 1981,
1991). Assessing agency change using the SOARS could help identify such strategies or artefacts (Orne, 1979). For example,
participants employing a compliant strategy might be expected to respond to suggestions without experiencing the invol-
untariness and effortlessness that would characterise the experience of individuals with altered executive monitoring or
control. For instance, researchers could use the SOARS in a ‘‘real-simulating’’ hypnosis design where the performance of high
hypnotisable participants is compared with the performance of motivated low hypnotisable participants who have been in-
structed to fake hypnosis (Orne, 1979). An analysis of differences in SOARS scores between genuinely hypnotised highs and
simulators might show those aspects of agentive experience that can be inﬂuenced by demand characteristics and those that
are inﬂuenced by genuine hypnotic alterations.
Finally, although it was developed within the context of hypnosis (and several of the items in the Effortlessness factor
explicitly refer to suggestions), this scale could be easily modiﬁed for use in other contexts (e.g., by substituting the word
‘instructions’ for ‘suggestions’). As a clinical tool, the SOARS offers a means to assess and track agency alterations over time.
As a research tool, the SOARS could be used to index speciﬁc ways that sense of agency is altered in under different circum-
stances. For example, behavioural illusion studies typically induce alterations in sense of agency but provide misleading
V. Polito et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 684–696 695feedback to participants about the effects of their own self-generated actions (e.g., Blakemore et al., 1998; Wegner, Fuller, &
Sparrow, 2003). Using the SOARS in this kind of research could highlight the effects of different manipulations across the
domain of agentive experience. Most importantly, the two SOARS subscales provide an operational conceptualisation of
sense of agency. By using this replicable, empirical measure, investigators could avoid the deﬁnitional and conceptual con-
fusion that has traditionally been associated with sense of agency research.Acknowledgments
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